ALGORITHMIC COLLUSION IN THE STOCK MARKET
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.56238/revgeov17n1-115Keywords:
Antitrust Violations, Algorithmic Collusion, Stock Exchange, High-Frequency Traders (Hfts)Abstract
This article aims to analyze algorithmic collusion in the stock market and its competitive implications. Recent studies warn that machine learning algorithms may possess the capacity to generate facilitating factors for tacit collusion among market operators. This could lead to unlawful practices such as creating artificial conditions for the demand, supply, or price of securities, price manipulation, fraudulent operations, and inequitable practices. This study intends to contribute to the initial discussions regarding the risks of algorithmic collusion.
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